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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2010, Tara Elonis left her husband, Anthony Elonis.1
Several months later, he directed a series of threatening posts on his
Facebook page to her, writing, “If I only knew then what I know now . . .
I would have smothered your ass with a pillow. Dumped your body in
the back seat. Dropped you off in Toad Creek and made it look like rape
and murder.”2 In another post, Elonis wrote, “[T]here’s one way to love
ya but a thousand ways to kill ya, And I’m not gonna rest until your body
is a mess, Soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts, Hurry up and
die bitch . . . .”3 Fearful of these threatening messages, Tara filed for and
was granted a Protection from Abuse order (“PFA”) for herself and her
children.4
Despite the PFA, Elonis continued to threaten Tara online by posting
messages on his Facebook page. In one such message, he posted a script
of a comedy sketch that mocked the idea that it is illegal to discuss
wanting to kill the president and how one could actually kill the
president.5 However, in posting the script on Facebook, Elonis replaced
the word “president” and details of the White House with his wife’s name
and details of her home, and described how he would murder her.6 In a
later post, Elonis wrote, “Fold up your [protection-from-abuse order] and
put it in your pocket, is it thick enough to stop a bullet?”7
The threats directed towards Tara were frightening, causing the
F.B.I. to later intervene.8 A lawsuit was brought against Elonis, charging
him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the federal threat statute, which
makes it a crime to transmit a threat through interstate communications.9
Elonis’s case eventually made its way up to the Supreme Court.10 Prior
to the Court’s ruling, nine circuits had adopted an objective intent
standard for interpreting § 875(c), holding that criminal liability attaches
if a reasonable person would have perceived the communication as a
1

Brief for Appellee at 10, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 123798), rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 11.
4
Id. at 11-12.
5
Kamatzu, Whitest Kids U Know: It’s Illegal to Say. . ., YOUTUBE (May 2, 2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEQOvyGbBtY.
6
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005-06 (2015).
7
Id.
8
Included in Elonis’ Facebook posts were also threats to injure “patrons and employees
of the [amusement] park [where Elonis had previously worked], . . . police officers, a
kindergarten class and an FBI agent.” Id.
9
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2002; 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2016).
10
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2001.
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threat.11 However, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the
objective intent standard was essentially a negligence standard, and that
mere negligence on the part of the offender was not sufficient for a
conviction under § 875(c).12 While purposefully or knowingly
communicating a threat would warrant conviction, the Court declined to
decide whether recklessness on the part of the offender would be enough
for conviction.13
Tara Elonis is not alone in facing online threats. In fact, a Pew
Research Center study found that young women ages eighteen to twentyfour are the most likely of all Internet users to experience severe forms of
online harassment including online stalking, sexual harassment, and
physical threats.14 As a result, women on the Internet are becoming
increasingly vulnerable to situations in which they are the target of threats
of sexual and physical violence. In her e-book, Targeted and Trolled:
The Reality of Being a Woman Online, Rossalyn Warren commented,
[O]nline abuse of women is not confined to sexual
harassment and stalking. How many times have you . . .
heard about a woman being sent a rape threat on social
media . . . This type of abuse has become so woven into the
fabric of the
Internet that it’s hard to imagine the Internet
without it.15
One such example is what happened to Zoe Quinn, a video game
designer. After she broke up with her boyfriend, he posted an article
describing her sex life in an effort to ruin her reputation.16 He then sent
the article to several website users who had a history of harassing her.17
As a result, Quinn’s personal information, such as her home address,
phone number, emails, and nude photos, was widely distributed to these
users, and she received thousands of death and rape threats.18 Some of
the threats that she received included, “Next time she shows up at a
conference we . . . give her a crippling injury that’s never going to fully
heal . . . a good solid injury to the knees. I’d say a brain damage, but we

11
There was no circuit split over the question because most circuits used only the
objective intent standard, although two outlier circuits required intent to threaten. Elonis, at
2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12
Id. at 2013.
13
Id.
14
Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 4-5 (2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/10/PI_OnlineHarassment_72815.pdf.
15
ROSSAYLN WARREN, TARGETED AND TROLLED: THE REALITY OF BEING A WOMAN
ONLINE 48 (2015) (ebook).
16
Zachary Jason, Game of Fear, BOSTON MAGAZINE (May 2015), http://www.
bostonmagazine.com/news/article/2015/04/28/gamergate.
17
Id.
18
Id.
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don’t want to make it so she ends up too retarded to fear us.”19 Another
threat stated, “Im not only a pedophile, ive raped countless teens, this zoe
bitch is my next victim, im coming slut.”20 Another threat read, “If I ever
see you are doing a pannel [sic] at an event I am going to, I will literally
kill you. You are lower than shit and deserve to be hurt, maimed, killed,
and finally, graced with my piss on your rotting corpse a thousand times
over.”21
To Quinn, these threats were serious enough to evoke fear that
caused her to leave her own home.22 To Tara Elonis, the threats were
enough to cause her to fear for her life, her children’s lives, and the wellbeing of her family.23 And they are not alone: other women face threats
of this magnitude as well; in 2006, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
estimated that approximately 850,000 people a year experience stalking
and threats via technology.24 And yet only around twenty-five cases each
year are pursued under the federal threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).25
When fighting online threats, law enforcement officials and
prosecutors should enforce and utilize the already existing federal threat
statute, § 875(c), to prosecute online threats. However, these officials
must also recognize that these online threats are unique and therefore
different from traditional offline forms of threats. In prosecuting online
threats, the federal threat statute can be strengthened through a
requirement of a recklessness for conviction. When litigating these
crimes, prosecutors and judges should take into account the entirety of
the circumstances, including the relationship between the victim and the
individual who is communicating the threat. In doing so, prosecutors
would determine whether or not the perpetrator should have been aware
that the victim would feel threatened, as opposed to whether or not the
perpetrator actually intended to carry out his or her threat. A recklessness
Simon Parkin, Zoe Quinn’s Depression Quest, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 9, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/zoe-quinns-depression-quest/.
20
Jason, supra note 16.
21
Jason, supra note 16.
22
Keith Stuart, Zoe Quinn: ‘All Gamergate has done is Ruin People’s Lives’, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/03/
zoe-quinn-gamergate-interview.
23
Brief for Appellee at 15, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013) (123798), rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
24
Danielle Citron, United States v. Elonis and the Rarity of Threat Prosecutions, FORBES
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/12/03/
united-states-v-elonis-and-the-rarity-of-threat-prosecutions/; see also Katrina Baum,
Shannan Catalano & Michael Rand, Stalking Victimization in the United States, U.S. DEP’T.
OF JUSTICE (Jan. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/legacy/
2012/08/15/bjs-stalking-rpt.pdf.
25
Citron, supra note 24.
19
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standard would allow for conviction under § 875(c) when the individual
was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his words may be
perceived as threats, and yet this individual consciously disregarded that
risk. Requiring recklessness under § 875(c) provides a clearer standard
for conviction, which will serve to protect more victims of online threats.
Additionally, a recklessness standard would act as a deterrent for those
who wish to threaten their victims online. Because prosecutors and courts
would be able to evaluate a threat under the entirety of the circumstances,
perpetrators of online threats would no longer be able to claim that their
threats are simply innocent words or misunderstandings.
Section II of this note will discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in
Elonis v. United States.26 Section III will explain the nature of online
threats, including how and why online threats differ from traditional
offline threats. Section IV will argue that prosecutors should utilize the
already existing federal threat statute, § 875(c), when prosecuting online
threats. Additionally, this section will argue that a mens rea of
recklessness is necessary in order to strengthen § 875(c) because not only
will a clearer standard generate more online threat litigation, but it will
also deter individuals from making online threats. This section will also
address several other techniques that are currently being used to fight
online threats, including the work of non-profit organizations, efforts by
social networking websites, and proposed legislation in Congress.
II. ELONIS V. UNITED STATES
In Elonis v. United States, Elonis was charged with violating the
federal threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which makes it a crime to
“transmit[] in interstate . . . commerce any communication containing . . .
any threat to injure the person of another.”27 One of the many difficulties
in prosecuting a case under § 875(c) is that the statute does not specify a
defendant’s required mental state. The statute itself does not explicitly
state that a defendant must intend that the transmitted communication
contain a threat.28 Implicit in this difficulty is whether the First
Amendment requires a defendant to “be aware of the threatening nature
of the communication” in order to be convicted of making a true threat,
which is a threat that is not protected by the First Amendment.29
At trial, Elonis argued that § 875(c) should be interpreted under a
subjective intent standard, which would require the government to prove

26
27
28
29

Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2001 (2015).
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2016).
Id.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004.
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that Elonis intended to communicate a threat.30 In contrast, the Court
instructed the jury to interpret § 875(c) under an objective standard,
stating,
A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally
makes a statement in a context or under such circumstances
wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of an
intention to
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an
individual.31
Elonis was found guilty and sentenced to three years and eight
months in prison.32 On appeal, the Third Circuit held that § 875(c) should
be interpreted under an objective intent standard, whereby a threat is
made willfully when “a reasonable person would foresee that the
statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily harm.”33
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Elonis again argued that § 875(c)
should be interpreted under a subjective intent standard and explained
that a “conviction of violating § 875(c) requires proof that the defendant
intended the charged statement to be a ‘threat.”34 Elonis argued that
without a subjective intent standard, people could be held criminally
liable for negligent speech.35 In contrast, the government, again,
advocated for an objective intent or a “reasonable person” standard,
arguing that a “conviction requires a statement that, to a reasonable
person, communicates an intent to do harm.”36
In its decision, the Court explained that § 875(c) does not specify a
mens rea requirement, but such a requirement must apply to establish the
fact that a communication contains a threat.37 Moreover, Elonis’s
30

Id. at 2007.
Id.
32
Id.
33
U.S. v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 332 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted), rev’d and
remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
34
Brief for Petitioner at 29, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983).
35
Id. at 20. Additionally, Elonis raised several First Amendment arguments. Id. Elonis
suggested that a subjective intent standard would not violate the First Amendment, as past
First Amendment jurisprudence suggests that before imposing criminal liability on speech,
there must first be a past history and tradition of requiring proof of intent to threaten, or proof
of prohibited intent before imposing such criminal liability. Id. Elonis also argued that a
negligence standard would “impermissibly chill free speech,” as such a standard is
unpredictable, given the possibility of discriminating against minority viewpoints, as well as
criminalizing “misunderstandings.” Id.
36
Brief for the United States at 14, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No.
13-983).
37
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011.
31
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conviction was based on how his posts would be understood by a
reasonable person, and this was “inconsistent with the conventional
requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.”38
The Court further explained, “Having liability turn on whether a
‘reasonable person’ regards the communication as a threat—regardless of
what the defendant thinks—reduces culpability on the all-important
element of the crime to negligence and we have long been reluctant to
infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes.”39 The
Court held that the government’s objective intent standard was essentially
a negligence standard and that “negligence is not sufficient to support a
conviction under Section 875(c).”40 The Court noted that the mens rea
requirement would be satisfied if a defendant either transmitted a
communication with the purpose of transmitting a threat or if the
defendant knew that the communication would be viewed as a threat.41
The Supreme Court, however, declined to determine whether
recklessness would be sufficient for criminal liability under § 875(c)
since there was no circuit conflict over the recklessness question and it
was not sufficiently briefed or argued by Elonis or the government.42
The Court’s decision leaves many questions unanswered. Justice
Alito expressed frustration with the Court’s decision in a concurring
opinion wherein he asked, “Would recklessness suffice? The Court
declines to say. Attorneys and judges are left to guess.” 43 Justice Alito
also noted that the decision would have “regrettable consequences”
because “[i]f purpose or knowledge is needed and a district court instructs
the jury that recklessness suffices, a defendant may be wrongly convicted.
On the other hand, if recklessness is enough, and the jury is told that
conviction requires proof of more, a guilty defendant may go free.” 44
For Justice Alito, a finding of recklessness would have been
sufficient for conviction under § 875(c). He agreed that there needed to
be more than mere negligence for conviction, but once past the
negligence threshold, recklessness sufficed.45 A recklessness standard is
not necessarily an objective standard because “[s]someone who acts
recklessly with respect to conveying a threat necessarily grasps that he is
not engaged in innocent conduct. He is not merely careless. He is aware

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2013.
Id. at 2012.
Id. at 2013.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2014 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2015.
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that others could regard his statements as a threat, but he delivers them
anyway.”46
III. ONLINE THREATS
In the wake of the Elonis decision, courts must now decide whether
to require a mens rea of recklessness under § 875(c). As such, it is helpful
to consider the definition of a true threat and the limits of First
Amendment protection over threatening speech. While there is no clear
definition of what constitutes a true threat, Justice Thomas, in his Elonis
dissent, explained the Court’s past jurisprudence on the subject, noting
that a threat is a “serious expression of an intention to commit unlawful
physical violence . . . it also cannot be determined solely by the reaction
of the recipient, but must instead be ‘determined by the interpretation of
a reasonable recipient familiar with the context of the communication.’”47
Moreover, Justice Thomas stipulated that “the communication must be
one that a ‘reasonable observer would construe as a true threat to
another.’”48
While the Court has not defined what constitutes a threat, “in
construing the same term in a related statute” the Court “distinguished a
‘true “threat”‘ from facetious or hyperbolic remarks.”49 The Court first
discussed threats in Watts v. United States, where Watts, while discussing
his draft classification at a public rally, stated, “If they ever make me
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”50 Based on
this statement, Watts was convicted of committing a felony by
“knowingly and willfully threatening the President.”51 The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court’s decision and explained that “[w]hat is a
threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected
speech.”52 Here, Watts had been engaged in “political hyperbole” by
stating his opposition to the President.53 The Court distinguished a true
threat from “uninhibited, robust, and wide open . . . vehement, caustic
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.”54
The Court has since consistently held that true threats, like other
46

Id.
See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2019 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Darby,
37 F.3d 1059, 1066 (C.A. 1994)).
48
See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478
(C.A. 2012)).
49
Id.; see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
50
Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-06.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 707.
53
Id. at 707-08.
54
Id. at 708.
47
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content-based restrictions, are not protected by the First Amendment.55
In Virginia v. Black, the Court further discussed the concept of a “true
threat” and suggested that the speaker of the threat does not “actually
need to intend to carry out the threat.”56
A. Punishment of Threats
Imagine the following scenario: someone calls a parent of a schoolaged child on the telephone and informs the parent of plans to blow up
the child’s school. Sherry F. Colb said that in such a situation, a parent
would likely be very frightened and would not want to send his or her
child to school that day.57 The school would probably close for the day
to investigate.58 That investigation would likely involve police and the
use of a bomb squad.59 Colb explained, “All of these effects are very
destructive and an unacceptable price to pay for the caller’s exercise of
his freedom to call [you] and utter the words, ‘I am blowing up your
child’s school today.’”60
In Virginia v. Black, the Court explained that prohibiting threats
“protects individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption
that fear engenders” in addition to “protecting from the possibility that
the threatened violence will occur.”61 It is clear that threats result in a
wide variety of detrimental and sometimes deadly effects for the
individual who is receiving the threat, and they also create high costs for
society. For the individual, these effects are economic, emotional,
psychological, or even physical, including “nightmares, heart problems,
inability to work, loss of appetite and insomnia.”62 For example, in
Tompkins v. Cyr, Dr. Tompkins and his wife were the victims of
anonymous callers and anonymous letters that threatened their lives

55

See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (July 10, 2002); see also U.S. v. Alvarez,
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (outlining several content-based restrictions on speech,
including “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action,” obscenity,
defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, “so-called ‘fighting words,’” child
pornography, fraud, and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government
has the power to prevent”).
56
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003).
57
Sherry F. Colb, The Supreme Court Considers “True Threats” and the First
Amendment, VERDICT (Dec. 10, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/12/10/supreme-courtconsiders-true-threats-first-amendment.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Colb, supra note 57.
61
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003).
62
Jennifer Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
283, 291 (2001).
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because Dr. Tompkins was a doctor who performed abortions.63 For the
Tomkins, the threats resulted in “reactions of fear, stress, anxiety,
depression, and sadness,” as well as problems with sleeping and eating.64
Eventually the family hired a bodyguard, began wearing bulletproof
vests, and moved Dr. Tompkins’s medical practice to another city. 65
Similarly, in Simpson v. Burrows, after Jo Ann Simpson and her
partner opened a lodge and restaurant, they began receiving letters
targeting them because they were lesbians.66 The letters threatened their
lives while calling them “abominations” that brought immoral and
unfavorable elements into the community. 67 Simpson explained the
effect the letters had on her life, explaining that her girlfriend had left her
and she had to buy a gun because she feared for her life.68 As a result of
the letters, she had trouble sleeping and had occasional nightmares.69 She
also stated that she “suffered various physical problems including upset
stomach, headaches, and crying jags.”70 Finally, Simpson explained that
she lost her trust in people.71
The effects of these threats on Simpson’s and the Tompkins’
personal lives were severe. Whether or not the anonymous stalkers
actually intended that their victims felt threatened had no bearing on
Simpson’s and the Tompkins’ fears or how they dealt with these threats.
Both sets of victims describe the physical effect the threats had on them,
including suffering from manifestations of the fear through insomnia,
headaches, and nausea.72 The fear also manifested itself psychologically
and emotionally; the victims both describe suffering from anxiety,
depression, and general feelings of sadness as a result of the threats.73
Additionally, the threats had a severe economic impact on both Simpson
and the Tompkins as both had to find ways to protect themselves by either
purchasing guns, wearing bulletproof vests, or even hiring bodyguards.
In the end, both had to move away, physically leaving their homes. 74
The reactions of the Tompkins and Simpson are common; in its
63

Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 782.
65
Id. at 777.
66
Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1118 (D. Or. 2000).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1121.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
See generally Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Or. 2000); Tompkins v.
Cyr, 202 F.3d 770 (5th Cir. 2000).
73
See generally, supra note 72.
74
See generally, supra note 72.
64
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survey of online harassment, the Pew Research Center estimated that
around twenty-seven percent of people who had been threatened or
severely harassed online in the past found it very or extremely upsetting. 75
Severe online harassment includes physical threats, sexual harassment,
stalking, or harassment over a sustained period of time, while mild or less
severe online harassment includes actions such as name-calling or
embarrassment.76 The Pew Research Study found that while men and
women are equally likely to have experienced some sort of severe
harassment, the reactions of men and women differed.77 Men are more
likely to experience more mild or less severe types of online harassment
in the form of name-calling and embarrassment while women are more
likely to experience severe forms of online harassment.78
There are many reasons for the disparate reactions of men and
women to online harassment and threats. One explanation may be the
different platforms where men and women experience the threats and
harassment. Young men explain that they often experience online
harassment within online gaming websites.79 In contrast, women note
that social networking websites and mobile applications are often where
they are harassed or threatened.80 A person’s online presence on social
media is often a reflection of their offline reality and personal life.
However, gaming websites take place in a virtual reality where it is easy
to distinguish the line where reality ends and fiction begins. Perhaps this
difference is why women experience more severe reactions to online
threats and harassment as compared to men—it is much more difficult
outside of online gaming websites to distinguish which threats are real.
In fact, Pew found that around fifty-one percent of women who have
“experienced severe harassment online found their most recent incident
‘extremely’ or ‘very’ upsetting.”81 Those who are victims of online
threats suffer from the disruption that fear engenders, and that very
disruption has a significant impact on victims’ lives. As such, a requisite
mens rea of recklessness to convict under § 875(c) is necessary to protect
victims from these online threats. A recklessness standard will serve as
a powerful deterrent to perpetrators of online threats and as a necessary
tool to ensure convictions under the federal threat statute.

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Duggan, supra note 14, at 32.
Duggan, supra note 14, at 13.
Duggan, supra note 14, at 13.
Duggan, supra note 14, at 13.
Duggan, supra note 14, at 6, 25.
Duggan, supra note 14, at 25.
Duggan, supra note 14, at 33.
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B. Threats and the Internet
Threats and stalking are often inextricably linked. A victim of one
is often a victim of both because threats are often included in stalking
behavior.82 When the Internet is used to communicate threats and
stalking behavior against a victim, the victim suffers in ways that she may
not have if the stalking and threats had been made offline. Requiring
prosecutors to show recklessness by an individual who is making a threat
is particularly important in the context of cyberstalking and internetbased threats because of the inherent differences in how these crimes are
experienced by online victims as opposed to traditional offline threat
victims.
Since its inception, the Internet has been utilized as a tool to commit
crime.83 Many people have used the Internet as a means to further extend
the reach of their offline criminal behavior. Stalking is one type of
criminal behavior that is now easier to commit through the Internet.84 The
Department of Justice defines stalking as “a pattern of repeated and
unwanted attention, harassment, contact, or any other course of conduct
directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to feel
fear.”85 Traditional notions of stalking include: repeated, unwanted,
intrusive, and frightening communications from the perpetrator, leaving
or sending the victim unwanted items such as presents or flowers, making
direct or indirect threats to harm the victim, damaging or threatening to
damage the victim’s property, or following the victim.86 Today, the
Department of Justice also includes in its stalking definition repeated,
unwanted or intrusive communications over the phone or email, as well
as posting information or spreading rumors about the victim over the
Internet.87
In fact, online stalking through technology and online threats often
differ greatly from traditional offline stalking and offline threats. Naomi
Harlin Goodno, Assistant Professor of Law at Pepperdine University,
outlined several aspects in which the use of technology to stalk and

See Stalking, THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ovw/stalking (last
updated Jan. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Stalking].
83
See generally Randy James, Cyber Crime, TIME (June 1, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1902073,00.html (outlining the history of
crimes perpetuated online).
84
Hi-Tech Stalking, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2009),
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/51dc541ce4b03ebab8c5c88c/t/54e3d1b6e4b08500fcb4
55a0/1424216502058/NNEDV_Glimpse+From+the+Field+-+2014.pdf.
85
Stalking, supra note 82.
86
Stalking, supra note 82.
87
Stalking, supra note 82.
82
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traditional offline stalking are different.88 The first is that when a
message is posted online, it is reviewed by a larger audience than if the
same message was spoken directly to an individual.89 Goodno explains
that “content can be widely distributed to a larger, more public forum
than any conventional form of offline stalking and it can be done so
inexpensively and efficiently.” 90 Goodno points to online forums, chat
rooms, and message boards, which have the potential for thousands of
people to view a single threat.91 Threats posted on these forums may
make a single threat against a victim more serious and severe. Rather
than only the intended target viewing the threat, more people can view
the harassment or threat and may be able to encourage others to
participate or join in the stalking and harassment of the victim. Goodno
explains, “[P]erhaps most frightening, and unique to cyberstalking, is that
cyberstalkers can incite other ‘innocent’ third parties to do their stalking
for them.”92 What may begin as a single harassing communication may
snowball into threats and stalking from an entire online community. 93
Take, for example, the women who received death threats after
posting on social media about the “GamerGate” controversy. 94 As a
result, the threats and stalking directed to the women involved were
“more intense, invigorated by the anonymity of social media and bulletin
boards where groups go to cheer each other on and hatch plans for

88
See generally Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 128 (2007). This note
will describe “cyber-stalking” as “the use of technology to stalk” or “online stalking.” See
From the Desk of the Director: Eliminating “Cyber-Confusion”, NAT’L NETWORK TO END
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2003), https://victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/eliminating-cyberconfusion.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
89
Goodno, supra note 88, at 128.
90
Goodno, supra note 88, at 128.
91
Goodno, supra note 88, at 128.
92
Goodno, supra note 88, at 132.
93
See Scott Hammack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line
Requires a Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 81-86 (2002) (explaining that the internet allows “like-minded” people
to socialize and develop friendships, and “this newfound social structure provides
encouragement to perform violent actions, mostly by making their beliefs seem more socially
acceptable”).
94
GamerGate is a “campaign to discredit or intimidate outspoken critics of the maledominated gaming industry and its culture.” The name “GamerGate” was “adopted by those
who see ethical problems among game journalists and political correctness in their coverage.
As a result of GamerGate, many critics of the gaming industry were threatened, however the
more extreme threats. . . seem to be the work of a much smaller faction and aimed at women.”
Nick Wingfield, Feminist Critics of Video Games Facing Threats in ‘GamerGate’ Campaign,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/technology/gamergatewomen-video-game-threats-anita-sarkeesian.html?_r=0.
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action.”95 Moreover, compared to traditional means of stalking and
communication of threats, such as letters or phone calls, the use of
technology to stalk is instantaneous and remains visible online long after
the victim first views the posting or email, allowing for revictimization
every time the victim logs online.
Another way that online stalking and online threats differ from
traditional offline stalking is that in the former, perpetrators are able to
utilize the Internet to harass and stalk their victims and communicate
threats to their victims from anywhere around the world with
expediency.96 Goodno explains the practical reality that victims face
because “[t]he uncertainty of the cyberstalker’s location can leave the
victim in a state of constant panic as she is left wondering whether her
stalker is in a neighboring house or a neighboring state.”97 While this is
similar to traditional stalking in the sense that a stalker may contact a
victim from anywhere around the world, the Internet provides “cyber
stalkers a cheap and easy way to continue to contact their victim from
anywhere in the world.”98 The fast-paced reality of the Internet allows
stalkers to post threats and frightening messages with the simple click of
a button.99 Stalkers no longer need to wait for a victim to answer the
phone or for a letter to be delivered for the stalking and the threat to be
communicated. The Internet facilitates the delivery of threatening
communications to stalking victims.
Next, online stalking and online threats are distinguishable from
traditional offline stalking and threats in that those who use technology
to stalk may remain truly anonymous.100 Though stalkers can remain
anonymous through traditional stalking, the Internet is often easily
accessible and is associated with anonymity. Individuals who may never
have communicated threats or stalked a victim in person can more easily
“overcome any hesitation, unwillingness, or inabilities he may encounter
when confronting a victim in person.”101 Moreover, when the perpetrator
remains anonymous, the victim is unable to assess the veracity of the

95

Id.
Goodno, supra note 88, at 129 (“Cyberstalkers can be physically far removed from
their victim.”).
97
Goodno, supra note 88, at 129.
98
Goodno, supra note 88, at 129-30.
99
See Hammack, supra note 93, at 81-86 (“[T]he relative low-tech nature of pre-Internet
communication allowed longer periods of time between the generation of a thought and one’s
ability to share it with others. This delay provided more time for deliberation and selfrestraint. Now, in a fit of rage people can email or post a threat, that with even a moment’s
reflection they otherwise would not have.”).
100
Goodno, supra note 88, at 130-31.
101
Goodno, supra note 88, at 130-31.
96
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stalkers threats, thus contributing to the fear of the victim. Brianna Wu,
a woman targeted in the GamerGate controversy explained how this
affected her: “I woke up twice . . . to noises in the room, gasping with
fear that someone was there to murder me. I can barely function without
fear or jumpiness or hesitation. I’ve been driven from my home. My
husband says he feels like he’s been shot.”102
Finally, online stalking and online threats differ from their offline
counterparts due to police response.103 The advent of social media is
relatively new, and when victims report online stalking and online threats,
they are often met with officers who are unsure how to respond.104 When
Amanda Hess, a writer for Slate magazine, informed a police officer that
someone had threatened to rape and kill her on Twitter, the police officer
responded, “What’s Twitter?”105 This reaction is not rare, and often
police do not take reports of online threats seriously because of their very
nature as threats on the Internet.106 Instead, police are often dismissive
of these online threats and “tell victims that no one is going to come get
them.”107
In 2014, online threats turned into a terrifying reality when a college
student posted several YouTube videos in which he threatened to harm
women for rejecting him, stating,
I am going to enter the hottest sorority house at UCSB and I
will slaughter every single spoiled, stuck-up, blond slut I see
inside there . . . I will take great pleasure in slaughtering all
of you . . . Yes, after I have annihilated every single girl in
the sorority house, I’ll take to the
streets of Isla Vista and slay
every single person I see there.108
After the last video was posted, the student acted on those threats,
first shooting people at a sorority house, and then shooting pedestrians on
the street.109 After the violence was over, he had killed six people and
Brianna Wu, It Happened to me: I’ve been Forced out of my Home and am Living in
Constant Fear Because of Relentless Death Threats from Gamergate, XOJANE (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.xojane.com/it-happened-to-me/brianna-wu-gamergate.
103
DANIELLE K. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 84 (2014) [hereinafter “HATE
CRIMES”].
104
Id.
105
Amanda Hess, Why Women Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, PACIFIC STANDARD
MAGAZINE (Jan. 6, 2014), https://psmag.com/why-women-aren-t-welcome-on-the-internetaa21fdbc8d6#.i3a3vwu8z.
106
Danielle Citron, Cops Don’t Take Harassment of Women Seriously—Especially
Online, TIME (Oct. 17, 2014), http://time.com/3513763/anita-sarkeesian-hate-crimes/.
107
Id.
108
Megan Garvey, Transcript of the Disturbing Video ‘Elliot Rodger’s Retribution’, L.A.
TIMES (May 24, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-transcript-ucsbshootings-video-20140524-story.html.
109
Ian Lovett & Adam Nagourney, Video Rant, then Deadly Rampage in California
Town, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/us/california-drive102
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wounded thirteen others.110 However, the shooter’s video warning was
not the first video that he had uploaded. In fact, his family had expressed
their concerns to police regarding several other disturbing videos the
shooter previously posted on YouTube.111 While police visited the
shooter in response to his family’s concerns, no other action was taken as
the police determined that he appeared “polite and courteous.”112 The
shooter acknowledged, in a written manifesto found after the deadly
shooting, that had police actually searched his apartment, they would
have found plans for the massacre and the weapon he would eventually
use during his killing spree.113
In her book, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, Danielle Citron highlights
the ongoing difficulty of police failing to take these threats seriously.
Citron notes, “The majority of law enforcement agencies do not
investigate online stalking complaints because they lack training to
understand the seriousness of the attacks, the technologies used to
perpetrate them and the usefulness of existing laws.” 114 Often, when
victims do report these threats to police, instead of receiving help, they
are told to stop using the Internet or their social networking websites and
to ignore the online threats or online stalking.115 However, this advice is
often difficult to follow and fails to appreciate both the necessity of the
Internet and the seriousness of the threats. Today, for many people, both
work and home life are inextricably linked to the Internet, smart phones,
and social networking websites. Smart phones have the capability to link
work and personal email, social networking websites, phone calls, and
text messaging to a single device. Pew Research Center estimates that
around ninety percent of American adults have a cell phone, and around
by-shooting.html.
110
Id.
111
Antonia Molloy, California Killings: Elliot Rodger’s Family Warned Police about
Killer’s Disturbing Online Videos Before Shootings and Stabbings, INDEPENDENT (May 25,
2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/california-killings-elliot-rodgerwas-described-as-polite-and-courteous-during-welfare-check-by-9432530.
html.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
HATE CRIMES, supra note 103.
115
See WARREN, supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Citron, supra note 106
(giving examples of police response to online threats and cyber harassment, ranging from
advising victims to stay offline and “encourage[ing] victims to ignore the abuse”). In 2013,
Jaclyn Munson, a writer for the Daily Beast, received death threats via Twitter and contacted
the NYPD. Jaclyn Munson, My Run-In with Anti-Feminist Twitter Death Threats, THE DAILY
BEAST (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
witw/articles/2013/09/05/my-run-in-with-anti-feminist-twitter-death-threats.html. Instead of
helping her, they informed her that “this guy is not perfectly capable of causing serious and
real harm.” Id.
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sixty-four percent of American adults have a smartphone.116 Moreover,
the Pew Research Center estimates that seventy-four percent of Internet
users use social networking websites, and around forty percent of
cellphone owners use social media or social networking sites on their
phone.117 Encouraging victims to simply turn off their devices or
computers and log off social networking websites neglects to take into
account the way most people live.
Moreover, encouraging victims to simply walk away from their
smartphones, computers and their social networking websites is only a
temporary and unrealistic fix to a problem that will not simply “go away”
for the victims. It also allows individuals to be further victimized by the
perpetrator by forcing them to forgo activities they enjoy or benefit
financially from in order to protect their personal safety. Instead, actions
must be taken to protect victims from the devastating effects of
cyberstalking and online threats.
C. Heightened Level of Online Threats Against Women
Women are subject to higher rates of severe online harassment,
including online threats, compared to men.118 These threats can be made
by anyone, and women report that the people making these threats are
anonymous strangers, friends, family members, and ex-romantic
partners.119 Text messages, email, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,
Tumblr, and countless other social networking platforms become tools
utilized to threaten and harass women. By requiring a mens rea of
recklessness to convict under § 875(c), prosecutors will have a powerful
tool to regulate conduct that most adversely affects women.
In her essay addressing this issue, Amanda Hess explains that, while
men and women both use the Internet, the majority of threatening and
harassing online communications target women.120 Hess pointed to a
study conducted by the University of Maryland in 2006 where researchers
created fake online accounts to interact with users in chat rooms.121 The
study found that accounts with female usernames received twenty-five
116

Cell Phone and Smartphone Ownership Demographics, PEW RES. CTR.,
http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/mobile/cell-phone-and-smartphone-ownershipdemographics/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).
117
Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).
118
Duggan, supra note 14, at 3.
119
Duggan, supra note 14, at 27.
120
Hess, supra note 105.
121
Hess, supra note 105; see also Study Finds Female-Name Chat Users Get 25 Times
More Malicious Messages, A. JAMES CLARK, SCH. OF ENG’G (May 9, 2006), http://www.ece.
umd.edu/News/news_story.php?id=1788.
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times more threatening messages than those accounts with male or
ambiguous names.122 When women experience online harassment and
threats, much of the harassment is gender-based.123 The gender-based
threats and harassment women face stem from an extensive history of
discrimination against women from a society that “promotes male
privilege by being male dominated, male identified, and male
centered . . . organized around an obsession with control and . . . the
oppression of women.”124 Online threats against women are distinct from
the type of threats that men may face because the online threats directed
toward women often target an “individual’s gender in sexually
threatening and degrading ways,” often in an attempt to control,
dominate, and silence women.125
The effects of online threats targeted at women are chilling. Instead
of fully participating in society, “Young women are deciding not to
pursue jobs in technology to avoid the crosshairs of men who don’t think
they belong. Women who are being asked to run for public office are
choosing to stay on the sidelines once they see the online abuse suffered
by their peers.”126 In short, women are “sacrificing their freedom of
expression for safety and self-preservation.”127 In a society where three
women a day will be murdered by someone they know, it is clear that
online communications that harass and threaten women should be taken
seriously.128 The Internet has now evolved into an environment where
online harassment and online threats are an expected reality of women’s
online experiences. The law must now evolve as well, and provide a basic
level of protection for women who are victims of online threats.

122
Study Finds Female-Name Chat Users Get 25 Times More Malicious Messages, A.
JAMES CLARK, SCH. OF ENG’G (May 9, 2006), http://www.ece.umd.edu/News/news_story.
php?id=1788.
123
Danielle Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment,
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378 (2009) [hereinafter “Law’s Expressive Value”].
124
ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL LEGACY 5
(2007).
125
Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 123.
126
Katherine Clark, Op-Ed., Sexism in Cyberspace, THE HILL (Mar. 10, 2015),
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/235070-sexism-in-cyberspace.
127
Id.
128
See Kaofeng Lee, Each Day, 3 Women Die Because of Domestic Violence, NAT’L
NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://nnedv.org/getinvolved/dvam/1307-dvamblog-series-1.html. Additionally, in January 2016 alone, “112 people were killed in suspected
intimate partner homicides, including children and bystanders. Men committed 89 percent of
the alleged fatal attacks, and 77 percent of the victims were women.” Melissa Jeltsen, This is
Not a Love Story: America’s Deadly Domestic Violence Problem, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(2016) http://testkitchen.huffingtonpost.com/this-is-not-a-love-story/.
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D. Use of Technology to Commit Domestic Violence
The use of technology to commit domestic violence has become a
significant problem in the United States as more and more women are
subject to online stalking and online threats. Women are at a greater
overall risk of experiencing stalking than men.129 Often, women are
exposed to cyberstalking and online threats through domestic violence.130
The United States Department of Justice defines domestic violence as “a
pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner
to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner.”131
Domestic violence includes “physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or
psychological actions or threats of actions that influence another person,”
and includes “any behaviors that intimidate, manipulate, humiliate,
isolate, frighten, terrorize, coerce, threaten, blame, hurt, injure, or wound
someone.”132
In an amicus brief, the National Network to End Domestic Violence
(“NNEDV”) explained that “these perpetrators are increasingly posting
to social media with descriptions of what they intend to do to their victims
and disclosures of personal, damaging, or humiliating information or
pictures of them.”133 An increasing number of women are experiencing
domestic violence through cyberstalking and online threats, and the
“exponential growth of technology and its impact on the way we
communicate will only increase the incidence of ‘high-tech’ stalking as
more digitally-native generations mature.”134 In fact, NNEDV has found
that batterers often misuse technology to monitor, harass, impersonate,
and stalk victims.135 NNEDV conducted a survey with victim service
providers and found that “[t]he top 3 types of technology that abusers
used to harass survivors were through texting (96%), social media
accounts (86%), and email (78%).”136 Moreover, NNEDV found that
around fifty-five percent of abusers post abusive content on social

129

Baum, Catalano & Rand, supra note 24.
Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 123.
131
Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/
ovw/domestic-violence.
132
Id.
133
Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 12, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983).
134
Id. at 13.
135
A Glimpse from the Field: How Abusers are Misusing Technology, NAT’L NETWORK
TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2014), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/51dc541ce
4b03ebab8c5c88c/t/54e3d1b6e4b08500fcb455a0/1424216502058/NNEDV_Glimpse+From
+the+Field+-+2014.pdf.
136
Id.
130
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media.137 In the end, the survey concluded that the widespread use of
technology is now being used as a tool “that easily facilitates abusers’
control.”138 New forms of technology have made it far easier for
perpetrators of domestic violence to control, manipulate, intimidate, and
threaten their victims.139 Furthermore, abusers’ misuse of the Internet
and social networking websites allows them to control and threaten their
victims without ever having to leave their home. In one instance, a
batterer publically announced on his Facebook page what he planned to
do to his wife, including plans “to hogtie her, put her in a trunk, pull out
her teeth one by one, then pull off her finger and toe nails, and chop her
into pieces, but keep her alive long enough to feel all the hurt and pain.”140
These threats of violence—including online threats—are indicators
that a woman may experience actual physical violence in the future. 141 In
another instance, one husband sent his estranged wife several text
messages, including statements that “[s]he better enjoy her last day in the
motel[.] Get ready for the shocker” and “Until death do us part bitch.”142
Months after he sent those text messages, he shot his wife in the head.143
Many lethality and risk assessment surveys—tools used to determine a
victim’s risk of being killed by her partner—have highlighted threats of
violence as a risk factor associated with an increased risk of murder for
the victim.144 Taken alone, a single threat posted on a social networking
website or sent through a text message may not rise to a level of
significant concern. However, in the context of domestic violence, these
threats are often followed through with actual physical violence. 145 At
times, this violence can be lethal.146

137

Id.
Id.
139
See generally, Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983);
A Glimpse from the Field: How Abusers are Misusing Technology, supra note 135.
140
Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 5, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983).
141
Joanne Belknap et. al., The Roles of Phones and Computers in Threatening and
Abusing Women Victims of Male Intimate Partner Abuse, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
373, 378 (2012).
142
Dickens v. State, 927 A.2d 32, 35 (Md. Spec. App. 2007).
143
Id.
144
See Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Danger Assessment, JOHNS HOPKINS U., SCH. OF NURSING
(2004), https://www.dangerassessment.org/DA.aspx.
145
Id.
146
Dickens, 927 A.2d at 35.
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IV. STRENGTHENING 18 U.S.C. § 875(C) TO PROTECT VICTIMS OF ONLINE
THREATS
While there are different laws that address online threats and
cyberstalking, § 875(c) specifically makes it a crime to transmit a threat
to injure a person through interstate communications.147 In the aftermath
of Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court left the question of mens
rea to the lower courts to decide, explaining that, if a person transmits a
threat with the purpose of issuing a threat or with the knowledge that the
recipient will view the communication as a threat, the requisite mental
state for § 875(c) will be satisfied.148 However, the Court did not address
the question of whether recklessness would be sufficient for conviction
under § 875(c).
A. A Requirement of Recklessness Creates a Clearer Standard to
Prosecute Online Threats
The Supreme Court has long established that, in situations where a
federal statute does not expressly state the requisite mental state needed
to be found guilty of a crime, it is required that a mens rea be read into a
statute “which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise
innocent conduct.”149 In Elonis, the Court explained that the legal
element that separated innocent conduct from wrongful conduct was “the
threatening nature of the communication,” therefore, “the mental state
requirement must . . . apply to the fact that the communication contains a
threat.”150 While the Court held that the minimum mens rea level of
negligence—where an actor should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk—was not sufficient for conviction under § 875(c),
reading recklessness into § 875(c) as the requisite mens rea would clearly
and sufficiently separate innocent conduct from wrongful and criminal
conduct.151
147

18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2016).
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015). On remand, the Third Circuit
upheld Elonis’s conviction, determining that the error in the jury instruction was harmless and
concluding “beyond a reasonable doubt that Elonis would have been convicted if the jury had
been properly instructed.” United States v. Elonis, No. 12-3798, 2016 WL 6310803, at *10
(3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2016). The Third Circuit declined to address whether recklessness would be
sufficient for conviction under § 875(c), noting, “Our disposition on the issue of harmless
error decides this case. Accordingly, we have no occasion to determine whether a finding of
recklessness would be sufficient to satisfy the mental state requirement of § 875(c). We will
leave that question for another day.” Id.
149
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (quoting United States v. XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)).
150
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011.
151
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 General Requirements of Culpability (AM. LAW INST.
2016).
148

JESSICA FORMICHELLA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

138

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

8/30/2017 12:15 PM

[Vol. 41:1

Justice Alito, in his concurrence in Elonis, explained, “[O]nce we
have passed negligence . . . no further presumptions are defensible . . .
and when Congress does not specify a mens rea in a criminal statute, we
have no justification for inferring that anything more than recklessness is
needed.”152 Moreover, Justice Alito stated that “[t]here can be no real
dispute that recklessness regarding a risk of serious harm is wrongful
conduct” and he cited several cases where the Court had described
reckless conduct as morally culpable.153 For example, in Farmer v.
Brennan, the Court held that deliberate indifference to inmates harm was
morally culpable.154 The Court equated deliberate indifference with
recklessness and held that, while deliberate indifference required
something more than negligence, “it was satisfied by something less than
acts for the very purpose of causing the harm, or with knowledge that
harm will result.”155 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Garrison v.
Louisiana, the Court held that civil libel and criminal libel were morally
culpable when the statement was false and made with reckless disregard
of whether the statement was true or false.156 Finally, in Tison v. Arizona,
the Court held that reckless indifference to human life may justify the
death penalty.157
A person acts recklessly when “he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element [of the crime]
exists or will result from his conduct.”158 Moreover, “the risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation.”159 In the context of
cyberstalking and online threats, whether or not a person actually knows
that someone will view the communications as a threat should not matter.
Criminal culpability should attach when the person who is
communicating a threat is aware of a risk that someone will view the
statement as a threat, chooses to deliberately disregard that risk, and
proceeds to communicate the threat anyway. With a requirement of
recklessness, the government will have to show that the actor was aware
152

Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
154
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
155
Id. at 835.
156
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
157
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
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of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his words may be received as
threats and that the actor consciously disregarded that risk, rather than
prove what the actor actually intended his words to be. As such,
recklessness allows for a clear distinction between innocent conduct and
the wrongful conduct that engenders fear in victims.
A heightened mens rea requirement of purpose or knowledge would
serve only to hurt victims of online threats who would inevitably have to
deal with the harmful aftermath of the threats. True threats were
prohibited to protect “individuals from the fear of violence and the
disruption that fear engenders, as well as from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.”160 Requiring a mens rea of purpose or
knowledge in § 875(c) would be “dangerously underinclusive” in future
threat prosecutions and would undermine the protections that a
prohibition on threats affords victims.161 Moreover, requiring knowledge
or purpose does not protect against the harms that these threats cause, but
rather it “effectively decriminalize[s] conduct that predictably and
reasonably creates a genuine fear of violence with all its attendant
psychological, emotional, economic, and social disruptions.”162
With a knowledge or purpose standard, it would be much more
difficult to convict under § 875(c). Often, it may be difficult or
impossible to prove what is going on inside an actor’s mind. It can be
hard to understand exactly why someone chose the words they did in
conveying a message that contained a threat. Whatever private reasons a
speaker has for “expressing himself in the way that he did - whether he
really meant to convey a threat or instead had other undisclosed reasons
for making the statement in question - are never directly accessible to his
audience.”163 Despite these undisclosed reasons, the negative effect on
the victims remains the same, and “some people may experience a
therapeutic or cathartic benefit only if they know their words will cause
harm.”164 A threat to kill or harm another individual still causes fear and
disruption for that person and ultimately has a detrimental effect on that
individual’s life.165
Moreover, if § 875(c) requires a mens rea of purpose or knowledge
160

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003).
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(internal citations omitted).
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to secure a conviction, a defendant could potentially avoid liability and
conviction by claiming “he was voluntarily intoxicated, or had some
other form of diminished capacity that he claims prevented him from
forming the requisite intent, when he made the threats.”166 Additionally,
a defendant may argue that he was not communicating a threat, but
instead was simply engaging in therapeutic venting. 167 This argument is
not new, and in State v. Slide, after threatening a judge, the defendant
argued that a jury could have “reasonable doubt as to whether it might
have been intended simply as artistic emotional venting.”168
Finally, like Elonis, a defendant may claim that a communication is
not a threat, but instead is a creative song or poem. In U.S. v. Heineman,
the defendant e-mailed a “poem” which resulted in making the recipient
fearful for his life.169 Whether it is a poem, a song, therapeutic venting,
or a drunken threat, the words still convey a threat to the intended target,
and the victims of these threats still suffer as a result of the threat. In
Elonis, Elonis should have been aware that his ex-wife would view the
statements as a threat, and yet he still posted his threatening “songs” and
“therapeutic rants” on his Facebook page.170 Under a recklessness
standard, that alone would have been enough to convict him. However,
requiring a mens rea of knowledge or purpose would significantly limit
the type of threats that can be criminally prosecuted under § 875(c),
which would severely diminish the available protections for victims of
online threats and online stalking.
B. A Requirement of Recklessness Will Protect Individuals from
Online Threats
Misunderstandings through online or text message communications
are common. When we speak to a person face-to-face, we are better able
to interpret the meaning of what they say through tone, facial expressions,
body language, and pacing.171 A sentence can sound friendly in one
instance and menacing the next, depending on the body language and tone
of the speaker. In online communications, readers are unable to see facial
expressions or body language and are unable to hear the speaker’s tone
or pace. In fact, “we tend to misinterpret positive . . . messages as more
166
Brief for Appellee at 33, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d
and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
167
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Brief for Appellee at 33, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d
and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
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U.S. v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2014).
170
Transcript of Record at 232, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
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Daniel Goleman, E-Mail is Easy to Write (and to Misread), N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/jobs/07pre.html?_r=0.
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neutral, and neutral ones as more negative, than the sender intended.
Even jokes are rated as less funny by recipients than by senders.” 172
One way people have attempted to remedy this issue is through the
use of emoticons or emojis.173 For example, Anthony Elonis claimed that
a Facebook post in which he advocated matricide against his wife was
made in “jest,” as he followed the threat with an emoticon of a face with
a tongue sticking out.174 While emoticons can be seen as an attempt to
address the problem of determining what a speaker means in an online
communication, they are not an adequate solution. In 2011, a University
of Michigan law student alerted authorities that a fellow classmate had
been harassing and stalking her; he had sent intimidating text messages
about her to her friends.175 One threatening text message included an
emoji of a face with a tongue sticking out, and again, similar to Elonis,
the perpetrator suggested that the emoji indicated the text message was
meant to be taken as a joke.176 The judge, however, explained that “the
inclusion of the emoticon, a ‘-D,’ which appears to be a wide open-mouth
smile, would not help [the perpetrator]. It does not materially alter the
meaning of the text message.”177 Moreover, a linguistics scholar has
noted that certain emoticons, such as a face with a tongue sticking out
and a “winky” face, are harder to interpret than a smiling or frowning
face.178 “Research has shown that the wink and the tongue are often used
to denote teasing or flirting, and interpreting the subtext of those activities
requires the reader to understand the power dynamics between texter and
recipient. Depending on the context, the emoticons can read as either
creepy or cute.”179
172

Id.
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines an emoticon as “a group of keyboard characters
that are used to represent a facial expression (such as a smile or frown).” Emoticon,
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When reading a Facebook post or a text message, two people can
read the same message and understand very different meanings behind it.
The NNEDV has outlined several factors that should be taken into
account in determining the context of an online threat.180 These factors
include how the words are likely to be understood; whether a reasonable
person would interpret the words as threatening, given the identities of
the speaker and the listener; the nature of the speaker and the listener; and
how the words are communicated.181 The NNEDV explains that “victims
are often the best assessors of the risk that the threats of violence they
face will be carried out.”182 Understanding the context of the messages
will allow law enforcement and prosecutors to discover a simple
message’s hidden meaning. A recklessness standard in § 875(c) would
allow for a careful review of context in online threat situations and would
allow courts to protect victims accordingly. While context can still be
ascertained under a purpose or knowledge standard, context in a reckless
standard is even more crucial, as it lessens the likelihood of pretextual
defenses that an online threat was intended as a joke or as a means of
creative expression.
For example, for the women targeted during the GamerGate
controversy, a recklessness standard would have permitted prosecutors to
prosecute the individuals who harassed and stalked the women under §
875(c).183 Though the women often did not know the identity of their
online stalkers, these individuals knew the women’s home addresses and
personal information. Moreover, many of the victims knew that the
stalkers had knowledge of their home addresses and personal
information, and had begun receiving death threats at their homes. An
individual who communicated a threat to physically injure any of these
women, and was aware that the women may view the communication as
a threat, but disregarded that risk and communicated that threat anyway,
acted recklessly and should be subject to criminal culpability under §
875(c).
Additionally, in the context of domestic violence, threats “are
inevitably interpreted in light of that history and against the backdrop of
an ever-present awareness of the correlation between threats of violence
and the likelihood the threats will one day be carried out.”184 Interpreting

180
Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 19, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983).
181
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182
Id. at n.34.
183
See supra Part III.B.
184
Brief for the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence et al as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 19, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983).
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a threat from an online post can only be determined through the context
of the threat’s words and the “audience’s shared understandings and
expectations of what particular words mean when they are used in a
particular way, in a particular context.”185 For example, in Elonis, Elonis
posted the threatening speech to his Facebook page after his wife had
gotten a civil protection order.186 When Tara interpreted Elonis’ words,
there was “no way [for Tara] to hear if there’s laughter in his voice . . .
[b]ut we know he’s angry, he’s been fired from his job, he’s been known
to sexually harass women. When we don’t have physical cues, it makes
the threat more frightening.”187 Elonis could have reasonably foreseen
Tara’s reaction because his threatening speech was an attempt “to get
inside her head and make her think there could be someone doing
violence to her.”188 In fact, “Elonis’ threats must be understood in an
environment where 40% to 50% of murdered women are killed by people
they know well.”189 As such, a recklessness standard would allow a court
to view the threat in light of the context of the threat and discover its
veiled and hidden meanings. Through strengthening § 875(c) with a mens
rea of recklessness, prosecutors would have a stronger tool to protect
victims of domestic violence from further violence at the hands of
batterers. Batterers are highly aware of the effects their words have on
their victims, and, when they choose to threaten their victims, they are
consciously disregarding the risk that their words may be perceived as a
threat. With a mens rea of recklessness, the batterer’s threats alone would
be enough to bring prosecutions against the batterer. This would allow
law enforcement and prosecutors to intervene before the batterer actually
carried out the threat, preventing a potentially deadly and devastating
outcome.
C. Additional Efforts to Fight Online Threats
While a recklessness standard under § 875(c) is needed to strengthen
the already existing federal threat statute, it is only a single step in a much
larger movement. There is still much more that needs to be done to fully
protect victims of online threats and harassment. On February 10, 2016,
185
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Zoe Quinn announced that she would no longer be pressing charges
against her ex-boyfriend who aided in her online harassment.190 In a blog
entry explaining her decision, she wrote, “[T]he criminal justice system
is meant to punish, not protect . . . And they’ve done nothing to protect
me - it’s only made things worse and become another weapon in his
arsenal, and the arsenal of the people out there way scarier than him.”191
Realizing that the justice system was failing to protect her, and women
like her, Zoe Quinn created the Crash Override Network, a community
dedicated to helping individuals who are the targets of online harassments
and threats through providing public resources, private casework, and
institutional outreach.192
Though efforts by non-profits can help victims of online threats,
social networking websites also need to acknowledge the severity of
online threats on their respective platforms. These websites often harbor
online threats and a stronger response is required by these website owners
to offer more protection to their users. Fortunately, some websites are
beginning to recognize the role they play in the occurrence of online
threats. On February 9, 2016, Twitter announced the creation of the
“Trust and Safety Council” to help fight online abuse, including behavior
“intended to harass, intimidate, or use fear to silence another user’s
voice.”193 The Council is comprised of over forty organizations and is
intended to create policies that will create a safer environment on
Twitter.194
Congress has also responded to the prevalence of online threats
through proposed legislation. On March 15, 2016, Congresswoman
Katherine Clark introduced a new federal bill, called the Cybercrime
Enforcement Training Assistance Act of 2016.195 The Cybercrime
Enforcement Training Assistance Act would establish federal grants to
train law enforcement personnel, prosecutors, and judges to identify and
investigate cybercrimes with the goal of protecting victims of
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cybercrimes.196 The bill would also establish federal grants to train law
enforcement personnel, prosecutors, and judges to enforce the existing
laws that already prohibit cybercrimes.197 In a column published by The
Hill, Congresswoman Clark explained that the bill is an effort to address
all of the types of intense online abuse faced by women, from domestic
violence victims to journalists, noting that “[w]e must not allow the
Internet to be closed to female voices, and intensifying the enforcement
of existing law is a critical first step to ensure the Internet is open to
everyone.”198
V. CONCLUSION
The online community has proven itself to be an unwelcoming
environment for many. The economic, emotional, and psychological
effects of online harassment are widespread and devastating. While
online harassment and online threats affect many people, they
disproportionally impact women and other vulnerable communities.199
Despite a growing awareness, the online community is still a place where
many people, from strangers to ex-romantic partners, feel that they can
attack, threaten, harass, and stalk people, often women, without any
consequences and with impunity. However, through strengthening the
already existing federal threat statute, law enforcement and prosecutors
can begin to combat these online threats. With a required mens rea of
recklessness to convict under the federal threat statute, 18 U.S.C. §
875(c), an individual can be held criminally liable for threatening a
person when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that his words may be received as threats. Individuals who utilize online
communications to threaten others will no longer be able to hide behind
justifications of their Internet anonymity, or their assertion that the
communications were simply “jokes,” “artistic expression,” or
“therapeutic rants.” Instead, by imposing a mens rea requirement of
recklessness under § 875(c), law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges
will be enabled to offer greater protections for these victims. With these
efforts, victims of online threats will finally be able to hold perpetrators
of online harassment and threats accountable for their actions.
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